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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SAl\1 B. CONOVER,

Case No.
12911

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE 0}-. THE CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's ruling
granting defendant-respondent's Motion to Quash the
Information and dismissing the charges in this case.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent's motion to quash the information
charging him with violating Section 58-33-6 ( l}, Utah
Code Annotated (Supp. 1971), was granted at a hearing before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of
the Fourth Judicial District Court on April 27, 1972,
and an order was signed quashing the information and
dismissing the complaint on May 4, 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
district court and an order reinstating the informatim.
against respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A complaint was filed against respondent on r'el
ruary 1, 1972, charging him with having committeu1
felony under Section 58-33-6 ( 1) of Utah Code
tated (Supp. 1971) by selling methamphetamine oc
December 19, 1971.
In 1971 the Utah Legislature passed the Utah Con·
trolled Substances Act which was codified as Title j!.
Chapter 37, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1971). Till<
act took effect on January 1, H>72, and specifical1
repealed Title 58, Chapter 33 of Utah Code
1953 under which the defendant was charged.
Respondent was arraigned on Febnrnry 14, J9ij
and had a preliminary hearing on l\Iarch 15, 1972, after
which he was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District
Court with an information being filed in the District
Court on l\larch 16, 1972. On April 4, 1972, a motion
to quash the information was filed in the Fourth Juili·
cial District Court. This motion alleged that the statuli
under which the defendant was charged had been If'
pealed on January 1, 1972, and was not a
for the complaint filed February 1, 1972. The mobon
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(}'ranted on April 27, 1972, at a hearing before the
Honorable Allen ll. Sorensen, Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, who signed an order quashing
the information and dismissing the case on May 4, 1972.
The appellant, State of Utah, has appealed this order.
was

0

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT
IN GRANTING HESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND IN DIS:MISSING THE
CASE.
The law is well established that:
"The outright repeal of a criminal statute
without a savings clause bars prosecution for
violations of the statute committed before the
repeal." In re Dapper, 77 Cal.Rep. 897, 454
P .2d 905 at 907 ( 1969) . See also S akt v.
Justice's Conrt of San Rafael, 26 Cal.2d 297
at 304, 159 P.2d 17 at 21, 167 ALR 833
( 1945).

Appellant contends that the Utah Code contains
such a savings clause. The clause on which appellant reis quoted in appellant's brief on pages 4 and 5. The
important provisions for purposes of this case are Sec-
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tions ( 1) (a) and Section 2 of 58-37-18 of Utah Coot
Annotated (Supp. 1971) which read as follows:
"(l) (a) Prosecution for ·violation of any law
or offensc occurring prior to the ef f ecrive date
of this act shall not be affected by this act;
provided, that sentences imposed after the effective date of this act may not exceed the
maximum terms specified and the judge has
discretion to impose any minimum sentence."
(emphasis added)
( 2) This act does not affect right and duties
that mature, penalties that are incurred, and

proceedings that are begun before its effectit1e
date." (emphasis added)
Clearly, the legislature intended these prol'isiono
to apply to prosecutions which were pending. The Ian·
guage of the statute is clear, it provides that "prosecu·
tions for violations occurring prior to the effectiw
elate" are save<l and "proceedings that are begun before
its effective date" are also saved. The
against the respondent were clearly begun after
effective date of the new Controlled Substances Act.
The statutory saving clause found in Secti.on
58-37-18 of the Utah Code Annotated was clearly JD·
tended to apply to pending proceedings. A
prosecution is pending within the meaning of a
clause from the time of the arrest and commitment of
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the accused. 22 C..T .S. 93, § 27. The Louisiana courts
have been called upon to interpret and define the word
"pending" as it refers to prosecution under saving
clauses. The courts have held that:

"A 'prosecution' is the means adopted to bring
a supposed offender to justice and punishment
by due course of law and consists of a series of
proceedings from the time when the formal
accusation is made by filing of an affidavit or
bill of irulictmcnt or information in the criminal court until the proceedings are terminated.
. . . . . . the inception of the prosecution. 'before a criminal court dates from the day that
the affidavit and other proceedings coming
from the committing magistrate are filed or
returned unto the criminal court ...... " State
v. J'Villiams, rn2 La. 713, 189 So. 112, 122
ALR 665 cited in 22 C.J.S. 93, § 27 (1939).
(Emphasis added.)

Other cases have held that:
"'Vhere a criminal statute is repealed without
a saving clause as to pending actions, the reviewing court must decide the case according
to the law at the time of final judgment in
such court and cannot pronounce, enforce or inflict punishment for violation of a nonexisting
statute." City of IJf onrnoth v. Lawson, 345
Ill.App. 44, 102 N .E.2d 188 ( 1951).
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In the case at hand we do have a saving clausea•
to pending actions, but clearly the proceedings again\
respondent were begun after the effective date of tf
new Controlled Substances Act.
11

Thus we return to the general rule that the repeii
of an existing statute under which a proceeding is penl
ing puts an end to the proceeding unless it is saYed \1
a ]JrO per saYing clause in the repealing statute. 22 C.J.I
90, § 27. Though we ha Ye a saving clause in the repeal
ing statute, it is not one which is proper to save proceea·
ings that are begun after the effective date of said stat
ute. The intent of the legislature was clear. It intendi:
to srwe prosecutions of pending proceedings. It didrn:
intend ·to save proceedings that were begun after
effectiYe date of the new statute.
The cases cited in appellant's brief are clearly iill
tinguishable from the case at hand. In State ex r1
II uff111a11 v. District Court, 154 :Montana 201, 461 P.ii
847 ( 1969), the
Supreme Court was asked I·
interpret a statute completely different from the oni
involved in our case. 'l'he statute in Huffman
follows:
"The repeal of any law creating a criminal
offense does not constitute a bar to the indict·
ment or information and punishment of an act
already committed in violation of the law so re·
pealed unless the intention to bar
indict·
ment or information and punislunent is ex·
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pressly declared m the repealing act." 461
P.2d 847 at 849.
The Montana Legislature clearly intended that any
indictment, information or punishment of an act already committed in violation of the repealed statute
should not be barred by the repeal of that statute. The
court's opinion points out that the Montana savings
clause was the child of a savings clause contained in the
California Political Code, § 329. In 1880 the California
Supreme Court held that this particular statute did not
apply to criminal prosecutions hy information, reasoning that the legislature could not have intended it to so
apply. Pt'oplt v. 'l'rasdalc, 57 Cal. 104 cited in Huffman, 461
847 at 849. The :Montana Legislature, by
adopting California Section 329 after the amendment
wh:ch negated the Teasdale decision, eliminated the
language relating only to pending actions. The court
held in the Huffman case that this unmistakeably demonstrateil that the l\Iontana legislature did not intend
to limit the scope of the statutory savings clause to
pending actions. See 461 P.2d at 849. As respondent
has already demonstrated, the Utah Statute is limited
to pernrng actions. Actions that are begun after the
effectiYe date of the repealed statute are quite clearly
outside the provisions of our savings clause.
A11other case cited by appellant is In re Dapper, 77
Rep. 897, 454 P .2d 905 ( 1969) . This case is again
distinguishable on two counts. ( 1) The prosecution of
Dapper in this case had been reduced to final judgment
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after the applicable statutes were repealed, and (2) lnt
Dapper case invoked the interpretation of severa:
municipal ordinances and whether these ordinances
been substantially reinacted. The court found
least three of the statutes under which Dapper had beer
charged had not been substantially reinacted and that
therefore, no prosecution could be validly maintainer/
against him for violation of those statutes. See 454P,ia
905, at 909.
In our case we are involved with the interpreta·
tion of a statutory saving clause. Though appellanl'i
brief briefly contends that there was a substantial re·
inactment of the repealed statute, respondent maintain;
that there clearly was not. The two statutes clearlyilif.
fer in both their scope and their content.
Under the old statute methamphetarnine was de·
fined as a "depressant, stimulant or halucinogenir
drug" under Section 58-:33-1 ( d) (2). Under the ne1
Controlled Substances Act methamphetarnine is definee
merely as a controlled substance under Schedule 2. See
58-37-4 ( 3) ( d) (iii) ( B) . The new act divides con·
trolled substances into five schedules, including schedule
2, which includes drugs which have "an accepted medi·
cal use in treatment."
Under the new Controlled Substances Act a
judge has a wide discretion to impose any rninimuJJ
sentence, including presumably no sentence at all'. 'fne
trial judge under 58-37-8 ( 10) also has this wide discretion. He may discharge and dismiss without any court
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adjudication of guilt. "Such discharge and dismissal
not he deemed a conviction for the purposes of
disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for con"iction of a crime." Thus respondent contends that the
two acts are entirely different in scope and content. The
new Controlled Substances Act does not constitute a
substantial reinactment of the repealed statute.
Appellant also alleges that Section 68-2-8 of Utah
Code Annotated 1953 constitutes a general savings
clause in this case. llespondent maintains that this reasoning is in error. Tf the legislature had intended that
Section 68-2-8 apply across the board as a general saving clause, such specific saving clauses as the one ref erred to in Section 58-37-18 would hardly be necessary.
The annotations contained in Utah Code Annotated
specifically point out the purpose of Section 68-2-8:
"The plain intent of this section was to steer
clear of any difficulty arising from the enactment of ex post facto laws and retain in force
the former crimes and punishment act so far
as it related to offenses committed prior to the
time the penal code went into effect." People
v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 ( 1877).
This case was also cited in appellant's brief and clearly
applies to this case but not in the m a n n e r assei'ted by appellant. The stah1te clearly was enacted
to prevent difficulties arising from drafting of
ex. post facto laws and to retain a specific act, the
Crimes and Punishment Act, in force prior to the time
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that the then new penal code went into effect. The pur.
pose of this legislation was specific not general.
The court should also note that these inferencti
are permissible from Section 76-1-2 of the Utah Coot
Annotated 1953:
"The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to these revised statutes. The provisions
of these revised statutes are to be construed
according to the fair import of their terms
with a view to effect the object of the statutes
and to promote justice."
It. should also be noted that there is no criminal
common law in Utah. If the legislature had intenden
Section 68-2-8 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 were to
generally apply as a saving clause to all statutes whicn
were subsequently repealed, a specific savings
such as the one contained in 58-37-18 would
necessary. Further, the enactment of Section 68-!·i
was to accomplish a specific purpose as pointed out in
People v. Sloan. Clearly this section does not operalt
to save the proceedings against respondent. The applica·
ti on of this section is urged by appellant as a general
savings clause is manifestly unfair.

Finally, an appellate court should be cautious in
overturning discretionary decisions of trial courts.
0
motion to quash may be granted for any number
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reasons including the one alleged by appellant. The
decisions of a trial court are generally upheld if they
can be upheld for any reason. See State v. Romeo, 42
Utah 46 at 69, 128 P ..530 (1912). Also an error in defendant's favor is generaJly considered harmless error.
State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488 (1915).

It has also been accepted that even though the
court may have errored in granting a motion on a particular ground, if it ought to have been granted on any
of the other stated grounds, the ruling will be upheld.
See Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P 977, 46
ALR 466 ( 1926) .
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based on the arguments listed below,
respondent urges that the decision of the trial court be
left undisturbed.
1. The specific statutory saving clause, Section
58-37-18, does not apply since the proceedings against

respondent were begun after the effective date of the
new Controlled Substances Act.

Appellant's cases and citations are not in point
and can easily be distinguished from the case at hand.
2.

3. There was no substantial re-enactment of the
repealed statute .

Section 68-2-8 does not operate as a general
savmg clause referring to the revison and repeal of
statutes.
. 4.

12
5. Furthermore, the Controlled Substances Act
provides that the trial court shall have a wide discretion
as to penalties imposed under this statute. A
tionary opinion of the trial court should not be disturbel
on appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD AND LEWI!
Attorneys for Respondtrd

